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Abstract 
The era of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono saw rising intolerance and 
even violence against minority congregations, Ahmadiyah and Shia; in the 
forms of attacks to places of worships; attacks to houses belonging to 
minorities, forced eviction targeting minorities and banning against 
religious activities.This article looks at what factors that contributed to 
President Yudhoyono’s response to the rising violence against the minority 
congregations during his two terms at the office (between 2004 and 2014). 
Scholars criticized the president for his seemingly in action in addressing 
the violence. Some scholars argued it was the agency of President 
Yudhoyono that contributed to his indifference toward the violence. Other 
scholars pointed out at more structural factors that they argued to have 
caused President Yudhoyono for being indecisive, ignorant or slow in 
making actions toward the rising intolerance, such as his childhood 
experience and family background and the revival of corporatist metaphor 
in the post-New Order era that impeded the president for making bold 
measures to fight for the minority rights. Through the case study of 
President Yudhoyono’s response to the violence, the article aims to 
contribute to Indonesian perspective on the classic debate about whether 
structure shapes the agency, or agency shapes the structure. In light of the 
arguments that the scholars proposed in the preceding paragraph, I would 
argue that we need to think of beyond binary opposition between agency 
and structure. Scholars, especially the essentialists, had the habit to 
determinatively point out at either agents or structures, which were held 
responsible for the occurrence of events, but, omitting either factor would 
ignore some aspects that had the potentials to enrich our understandings 
about what motivates the agents in making social actions. 
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President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won direct presidential 
elections two times (2004 and 2009) with strong mandates, and hence, 
public were confident that he would be able to live up to people’s 
expectations, including in the area of promoting minority rights. But, his 
era saw rising intolerance and even violence against minority congregations, 
Ahmadiyah and Shia; in the forms of attacks to places of worships; attacks 
to houses belonging to minorities, forced eviction targeting minorities and 
banning against religious activities. Human right group, Setara Institute, 
reported 135 cases of intolerance and violence against the minorities in 
2007, 265 in 2008, 200 in 2009, 216 in 2010 and 244 in 2011.2 Other 
group,Wahid Institute, reported that 234 cases of human right violations 
occurred in 2008, down to 35 in 2009, but steadily rose to 64 in 2010 and 
93 cases in 2011.3 
 This article looks at what factors that contributed to President 
Yudhoyono’s response to the rising violence against the minority 
congregations during his two terms at the office.The president’s practices 
deserve to be given special space, given that the governance affairs related to 
the incidents of religious violence – namely religious, domestic security and 
judiciary – were still in the hands of the central government, in which the 
president topped its structure.4 The Indonesian president had the vast 
power to mobilize bureaucracy and security resources to prevent or to curb 
incidents of religious violence.5 President’s policies bore repercussions 
down to the village level. When President Yudhoyono was considered to 
have failed to address the rising violence against Ahmadiyah and Shia 
congregation, scholars began to question his seemingly inaction in response 
to the violence.  
 Then, what propelled President Yudhoyono to act or to be in action 
in cases related to the incidents of religious violence? Some scholars argued 
it was the agency of President Yudhoyono that contributed to the violence. 
Robin Bush, for example, suggested that the president was complicit in the 
violence, because he “was not an innocent bystander to the deterioration of 
minority rights and religious pluralism during his presidency, but made 
conscious choices that contributed to it” (Bush, 2015, p. 241). Other 
scholars pointed out at more structural factors that they argued to have 
caused President Yudhoyono for being indecisive, ignorant or slow in 
making actions toward the rising intolerance. Such these factors were, 
among others, his childhood experience and family background (Fealy, 
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2015, pp. 50-51; Takwin&Karim, 2004, p. 241), and the revival of 
corporatist metaphor6in the post-New Order era that impeded the president 
for making bold measures to fight for the minority rights (McCoy, 2013, p. 
297).  
Through the case study of President Yudhoyono’s response to the 
violence, the article aims to contribute to Indonesian perspective on the 
classic debate about whether structure shapes the agency, or agency shapes 
the structure. In light of the arguments that the scholars proposed in the 
preceding paragraph, I would argue that we need to think of beyond binary 
opposition between agency and structure. Scholars, especially the 
essentialists, had the habit to determinatively point out at either agents or 
structures, which were held responsible for the occurrence of events (Fuchs, 
2001, p. 24), but, omitting either factor would ignore some aspects that had 
the potentials to enrich our understandings about what motivates the 
agents in making social actions. To support the argument, the article is 
arranged in the following structure: the first section is to discuss key 
arguments behind the debate between the proponents of structuralism and 
rational actor theory, which give framework to my analysis on the 
president’s response to violence against the minority congregations. The 
second section is to explain Yudhoyono’s education and family 
background, which would be useful to assist us in making sense about 
Yudhoyono’s dispositions when he was in office.It will be followed with the 
third section that discussed the patterns of Yudhoyono’sresponse to 
violence against Ahmadiyah and Shia congregations. The fourth section 
will discuss on the limits of structural and rational actor theory to explain 
the agency of President Yudhoyono in response to the violence against the 
minority congregations. The sectionis to discuss on the interplay between 
agency and structure, which reconcile the opposing arguments between the 
structural and rational actor theory. The fifth section is to discuss the study 
cases of President Yudhoyono responding to violence against Ahmadiyya 
and Shia. The section will show that the interplay approach is more sensible 
to explain the president’s disposition in responding to the violence. The 
sixth section is the conclusion.  
The agency versus the structure 
I will begin the article with explaining the debate between the 
proponents of structural and rational actor theory. In regard to the practice 
of human being in social system, structuralist scholars believed that human 
being performed social functions based on habit. Claude Levi-Strauss, 
among others, argued human beings were duped by social structures, and 
hence, “the extraordinary resistance offered to even minimal departures 
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from custom is due more to inertia than to any conscious desire to 
maintain usages which have a clear function” (Levi-Strauss, 1963, p. 19). 
Social structures were considered as constraint; which impeded human 
beings from making social actions against the structure. Given the sturdy 
shape of the structure, small changes might occur, but the big ones, such as 
revolution that changed radically the structure were hard to occur. The 
structure hindered such revolution to happen. Numerous other scholars 
showed the structure influenced the agents in performing social actions, 
such as Max Weber, who showed that how Protestant ethics shaped and 
gave spiritual force for Protestants in the Germany to accumulate capital 
(Weber, 2001).  
This frame of thinking, which considered human beings as merely 
automatons to perform their functions in society, ignored human being’s 
capacity to think and to act in rational manner.In contrast to Max Weber’s 
argument, Peter M. Blau argued that the agency shaped the structure, albeit 
indirectly. It was individual economic behaviour that shaped the capitalist 
structure in the society, through the unintended consequence of their 
rational behaviour (Blau, 1997, p. 21). In other subject, for example, the 
social religious subject, we might think about the capacity of the individual 
to change the deep seated social and culture structure. For example, the 
influence of the Prophets that shaped the life of subsequent generations 
provided testaments about how an actor had considerable power that 
materialized profound change in the society’s social systems. Through their 
charisma and their claims to be the representative of the Divine Force, the 
Prophets did not only help change the social system where they lived, but 
through their disciples, their teachings or their models of behaviour; they 
radically changed the structures of society elsewhere around the world from 
one to subsequent generations. Although, in most cases, the structure 
influenced and shaped the attitude and even the rational thinking of the 
agents and his or her power to transform the society; but, the evidence that 
I just presented about the Prophets showed that the individual had the 
capacity to transform or even to change radically the existing social structure 
and turned it to new ones.  
Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu supported the notion about 
relatively stable structure, but the two scholars opposed the deterministic 
fashion of the structuralist. Instead of arguing that the structure shaped or 
transformed agency and vice versa, Giddens argued that they mutually 
reinforced each other. According to Giddens, the structures constituted 
social actions; however, the social actions produced by the agents then re-
inforced the structure. People produced social actions following the laws; 
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but when people didthe social actions obeying the laws, they reproducedthe 
laws and strengthenedthe laws’ existence. In contrast to structuralist 
argument that the structure was constraining factor to produce change in 
the structure, Giddens argued that the structure was not merely 
constraining, but it was also becoming enabling factors (Giddens, 1984, p. 
162). Social context needed to be taken into account to determine whether 
the social structure was constraining or enabling. For example, labour 
contract, as rule-resource set, shaped the way workers work and usually 
favoured the employers. However, on the other hand, the labours had the 
capacity to change the contract to serve their interests.  Labours were 
dependent to the employers’ resource, and the labour relations produced 
mutual economic benefit between worker and his or her employer 
(Giddens, 1984, p. 177).  
Giddens’ account is compatible to Bourdieu. Both aimed to reconcile 
prolonged debate about agency versus structure, however, in comparison to 
Gidden’s version about the role of agents, Bourdieu’s thought implied less 
conscious agents. The agent’s past experiences – especially through 
education or social exposure and immersion in certain class, gender or race 
–structured his or her mental structure (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 53-54). This 
mental structure drove the agent’s inclination to act; although in some 
cases, the agents were conscious enough to resist the mental structure and 
hence, he or she was able to act against the routines. Bourdieu’s argument 
was in response to the structuralist’s deterministic tendency that 
emphasized that the structures influenced the agent;and the unconscious 
agent did what the structures dictated. According to Bourdieu,agents had 
subjective dispositions to balance the demands of the structure 
(Chaffe&Lemert, 2009, p. 136), and the continuous process of adjustment 
between the agents and the structure resulted to the production and the 
reproduction of relatively stable structure.  
 The frameworks that Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony 
Giddensproposed were to reconcile subjective and structuralist views about 
what motivatedthe actions of human beings. The frameworks were useful to 
assist researchers or social observers to avoid being followers of the 
deterministic nature of the structuralist, which could let them for being 
one-sided in their quest of explaining the causes that motivated human 
beings to act. The middle-way that Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens 
proposed helped produce more holistic and balanced research frameworks. 
This is useful because social phenomenon occurred due to the 
contributions of variety of factors.However, on the other hand, the 
frameworkswere too accommodative to the variety of factors that prompted 
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the agents to act in certain circumstances. It resulted to their failure to 
produce bold explanations about social phenomena that the researchers 
were investigating. The frameworks that they discussedwere the open ones, 
in a sense that the answers to social phenomena were not definite, but 
infinite; which depended on temporality and geography; and hence, they 
would lose the power of generalization that became the hallmark of the 
structuralist. Despite the shortcoming, Giddens and Bourdieu accounts 
remained useful to serve as framework for me to explain what prompted 
Yudhoyono to act in cases related to the incidents of religious violence. 
Thisarticledoes not intend to seek for the most prominent cause, but aims 
to show the limitations of the deterministic mode of the structural frame of 
thinking. To understand the president’s practice, we need to seek for more 
holistic picture, so that we could explain betterand capture more nuances in 
the president’s practice in preventing and handling incidents of religious 
violence during the era of President SusiloBambangYudhoyono.  
 
Yudhoyono’s education and family background – secular and moderate 
One of ways to understand about Yudhoyono’sdispositions – 
especially related to his responses to the incidents of religious violencein the 
duration of his presidency – can be gauged through his family background 
and education. The way his parents raised him in the family, and the 
influence of education and professional occupations that he pursued, 
shaped his responses to the violence against Ahmadiyya and Shia 
congregations. Greg Fealy(2015, pp. 50-51) argues Yudhoyono was raised in 
un-happy family, which created the sense of insecurity in the later period of 
Yudhoyono’s life. The sense of insecurity contributed to Yudhoyono for 
being indecisive person, which was reflected in Yudhoyono’s response to 
the violence. Psychologists BagusTakwin and Ninik L. Karim (2004, p. 241) 
argues that Yudhoyono, being the only child in the family, was in constant 
need of attention. A person of this type tended to avoid conflicts and to 
perform actions popular to people, so that he remained to be loved 
(Takwin&Karim, 2004, p. 241). The following paragraphs will show that 
those arguments have some merits.  
 Yudhoyono was born in poor regency of Pacitan, situated in East 
Java province. He was the only son of Soekotjo, a lowrank military officer 
and SitiHabibah, a house wife. As a child, Yudhoyono endured un-happy 
family life. His father and his mother divorced when he was studying at 
junior high school (at the age of 15 or 16). The divorce left great mental 
scar to Yudhoyono, and he vowed that he would work hard to be someone 
to change his unfortunate life (Fealy, 2015, p. 39; Hisyam, 2005, pp. 56-57).  
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 Besides being driven to attain success, Yudhoyono was known to 
love being in the spotlight. When he was student, he formed a music group 
(Gaya Taruna), in which he was becoming bassist. He also wrote poems; the 
practice that he continued doing in his professional and political career. 
Given that people’s attention was important for Yudhoyono, he tried to be 
seen perfect and loved to gain sympathy and support from people. 
Journalist WisnuNugroho, who served as the State Palace correspondent for 
influential Kompasdaily when Yudhoyono was in reign, recalled that 
wanting to be seen perfect was one of Yudhoyono’s distinct traits.As a 
result, Yudhoyonowas also careful and always had second thoughts before 
making decisions. The combination of these traits often led him to be 
portrayed as “indecisive and sluggish in making actions or decisions” 
(Nugroho, 2004, p. 232).  
 Related to religious outlook, Yudhoyono had mixed upbringing, 
although secular outlook was apparently more dominant. His mother was 
religious. She taught Yudhoyono “to pay more attention to the faith and 
the devotion to the God” (Hisyam, 2004, p. 39). In contrast to his mother, 
his father had secular orientation, although he graduated from Gontor 
Islamic boarding school in East Java province. While his mother taught him 
about the religion (Islam), his father taught Yudhoyono about the secular 
discipline and good work ethics (Hisyam, 2004, p. 39).  
 His parents’ different religious orientation was also easily known 
through their different choice of education for their children. His mother 
wanted Yudhoyonoto be sent to Tremas Islamic boarding school in the 
village to pursue Islam education, but the father insisted that he was sent to 
secular, public school. At the end, his father won the arguments, and 
Yudhoyonowas sent to secular schooling. The domination of secular 
environment continued after he graduated from the senior high school. His 
life after high school education indicated that he was heavily exposed to 
secular environment. He entered the technical and teacher institute, before 
he ended up being cadet in the military academy. He had courtship with 
the daughter of prominent military man, who was coming from secular 
background, and finally married her. His professional life at the Indonesian 
military strengthened his secular outlook, given that the institution imposed 
secular and centrist ideological outlook to their members. The institution 
often claimedthat it stroveto be glue that holds the heterogeneous country 
together.  
 Yudhoyono moderation in politics was result from personal trait. In 
regard to personal trait, Yudhoyono did not like confrontation. The 
moderation was reflected in politics when he got older. During his days at 
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the military, Yudhoyono remained in the neutral faction of the Indonesian 
military during the New Order era, dominated by Green and Red-White 
factions, inspired and influenced respectively by PrabowoSubianto and 
Benny Moerdani. He was unlike Benny Moerdani, the traditional 
Indonesian soldier, or PrabowoSubianto, who was easily kow-towing with 
the conservative Muslims. He kept distance from the politics and believed 
on the merit of democracy; and professional soldiership.7 
 Yudhoyono’s involvement in the politics began after he prepared for 
his presidential bid in the run up to the 2004 election. Given that he was 
lacking in Islam credential, he started to play Islam card to win the 
presidency. He was trying to be acceptable among Muslims. For example, 
given the popularity of dzikirakbar(collective remembrance of God) in 
Indonesia in early 2000, Yudhoyono established his own dzikir council, 
called MajelisDzikirYudhoyonoNurussalam (Light of Peace 
Yudhoyono’sDzikir Council).8 The dzikir council initially held regular 
function in Yudhoyono private residence in Cikeas, Bogor regency every 
Thursday night. But, as the 2004 election was approaching, the functions 
were expanded to other cities, including the Yudhoyono’s hometown of 
Pacitan regency,East Java (Hasan, 2013, p. 119). The function (dzikirakbar) 
was strategic effort to galvanize support for Yudhoyonoas it was usually 
attended by hundreds or even thousands of people. At least, the dzikirakbar 
could be used to polish Yudhoyono Islam credential, which could make 
Muslim voters feel comfortable towards Yudhoyono. The dzikirwas also 
campaign instrument for Yudhoyono, in which during the dzikirfunctions, 
the preachers often inserted prayers and subtle calls for people to vote for 
Yudhoyono in the 2004 presidential election.  
 After he assumed presidency, he continued to play the Islamic card 
to maintain support among Muslims to stay in power and to seek for re-
election. At times, he was even doing politics adventure, by courting 
prominent Muslim group (the Indonesian Council of Ulema or MUI), 
which was becoming more conservative in the post-New Order 
era.9However, his outlook remained moderate, inclusive and plural; for 
example, he regularly attended religious functions of other religions; despite 
criticism from some conservative Muslims. Adherents of Christianity and 
Hinduism and non-Javanese were given key positions at the Democratic 
Party. Yudhoyonoattempted to appear inclusive, by attracting all politics 
spectrums. Yudhoyono used religious nationalism as his party platform, 
which established his moderation credential and his tendency for more 
balanced, inclusive and un-confrontational outlook. The platform was the 
manifestation of Yudhoyono’s wishes for the Democratic Party to have 
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“convenient ideological platform” (Artha, 2009, p. 83). The ideology was 
middle way response to the nationalist party line perpetuated by the 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), in which the critics often 
considered it too secular and undervalue the role of religion. On the other 
hand, the religious nationalism was to respond to parties that promote 
religious conservatism such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the 
United Development Party (PPP). The ideology was pursued to cement 
“party’s carefully balanced position on the political role of Islam” (Mietzner, 
2013, p. 174). The centrist platform was also meant to be inclusive tool for 
the Democratic Party to garner more support from all walks of life of the 
Indonesians. Yudhoyono long wished for the end of segregating 
Indonesians into secular-nationalist and religious camps. The Democratic 
Party’s religious nationalism platform envisaged that it would end such 
segregation and accommodate all Indonesians from the opposing politics 
outlooks (secular-nationalist and religious camps) (Artha, 2009, p. 83).  
Yudhoyono upbringing, formal education and military career shaped 
Yudhoyono’s politics dispositions when he was president. He claimed that 
there was no single ideology that shaped his politics beliefs, saying that 
various factors influenced his politicaloutlooks. Yudhoyono mentioned 
Islam being the first factor that influenced his politics outlooks, but he also 
did not hesitate to acknowledge that Western democracy took important 
part in guiding his politics. Yudhoyono wrote: “my faith was shaped and 
influenced by variety of things: Islam, Javanese and Eastern cultures, local 
wisdoms, common-sense, the can-do spirit, soldiership value and 
orientation, democracy and universal values, practical and theoretical order 
of politics, law and order, and may more” (Yudhoyono, 2014, p. 674). The 
multiple social, religious and political outlooks that President 
SusiloBambangYudhoyono followed suggested that he was trying to be 
inclusive; but it was also signal that he had no firm ideologies. His 
statement showed his centrist and un-confrontational character, which was 
reflected in his practice as the President.  
I have discussed about Yudhoyono’s family and education 
background that may affect his dispositions in affairs related to minority 
rights and the incidents of religious violence. But, what prompted President 
SusiloBambangYudhoyono to resort to certain practices? Was his action 
shaping the structure or being shaped by the structure? I will address the 
questions in the following section.  
Past experiences, ideological factors versus rational actor  
In earlier sections, I elaborated about the vast power of the 
Indonesian president, and then followed with President 
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SusiloBambangYudhoyono’s dispositions, influenced by his past 
experiences. These two sections were correlated. Given the vast presidential 
power and the people’s strong mandate, public expected that President 
SusiloBambangYudhoyonowould be firm and resolute in supporting the 
minority rights by combating the growing acts of intolerance during his two 
terms of presidency. When the incidents of religious violence were on the 
rise in the duration of his reign, the critics pointed out at his failure to 
mobilize the bureaucracy and security resources (Bush, 2015, p. 248).  
 Some scholars argued that Yudhoyono’s indecisive traits were 
behind his slow and weak response to the rising intolerance, which led to 
the incidents of religious violence. The scholars explained that the traits 
were coming from structural factors. Through psycho analysis method, Greg 
Fealy argues Yudhoyono’s actions were based on childhood background 
(Fealy, 2015, p. 50-51). His analysis centres on argument that Yudhoyono 
was raised in un-happy family, and it created the sense of insecurity 
throughout the life of Yudhoyono. The sense of insecurity contributed to 
Yudhoyono for being indecisive person. Other scholars also produced 
analysis about Yudhoyono actions through psychologist perspectives, which 
provided further justification that this kind of method was useful to explain 
Yudhoyono’s dispositions when he was in office. In their analysis, 
BagusTakwin and Ninik L. Karim argued that Yudhoyono, being the only 
child in the family, was in constant need of attention. A person of this type 
tended to avoid conflicts and to perform actions popular to people, so that 
he remained to be loved (Takwin&Karim, 2004, p. 241). Meanwhile, Mary 
McCoy argued that the structural constraint – namely, the revival of 
corporatist metaphor – impeded the state officials, including President 
SusiloBambangYudhoyono, to speak out and to combat religious 
intolerance. Due to the strong current of corporeal metaphor rhetoric in 
the post-reform era, the president (SusiloBambangYudhoyono), and leaders 
of all type in Indonesia, were “reluctant to critique certain justifications for 
religious intolerance….and forging such absences by allowing a small 
minority of religious fundamentalists to use physical intimidation to 
enforce purification and to manipulate fears for being labelled as “anti-
Islam”, silencing critics and thereby controlling the conversation” (McCoy, 
2013, p. 297).  
 The structuralism view that I presented above considered that the 
structure is the constraint; namely that first, the childhood background 
prevented Yudhoyono for being more progressive in promoting pluralism; 
and second, the corporatism metaphor prevented the leaders, including 
Yudhoyono, to follow progressive stance and to stand up against the rising 
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intolerance. However, these deterministic views were inadequate to present 
more holistic picture of the president’s practices. In contrast, Pierre 
Bourdieu argued that the social actors had the capacity to resist and 
negotiate the social structures (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). As I elaborated 
earlier, president Yudhoyono was rational actor that chose to perform some 
actions to win the presidency and to stay in power. His actions were often 
measured. He did calculations, and at times, he did it masterfully to avoid 
him being target of public criticism. He could be indecisive (peragu). The 
indecisiveness can be detected and spotted when he was confronted with 
the spontaneous event; however, in many other events, he had ample of 
time to decide and took decision when the time was right after consulting 
with others and surveys. Hence, it was not right if we say that all of his 
actions were driven by the indecisive trait, because when he had sufficient 
time and information to decide, he could produce firm and measured 
decisions to advance his own interests. Robin Bush argued that Yudhoyono 
was a rational actor that promoted self-interests. Yudhoyono was “not an 
innocent bystander to the deterioration of minority rights and religious 
pluralism during his presidency, but made conscious choice that 
contributed to it” (Bush, 2015, p. 241). Yudhoyono contributed to the 
rising incidents of religious violence at the expense of adherents of 
Ahmadiyah and Shia through appointment of conservative individuals, 
which became key figures during his administration; his kow-towing to 
intolerant organizations and was not doing hard enough or was being 
ignorant to the production of intolerant regulations and legislations during 
his two terms (Bush, 2015, pp. 246-251).10 
 Although the preceding paragraphs show that the rational actor 
theory was convincing in explaining President Yudhoyono’s dispositions, it 
is not necessarily that we omitted the structural arguments. The structural 
arguments remained influential in explaining human being dispositions. I 
already discussed some structural arguments, presented by some scholars in 
the earlier paragraphs of this section. Scholar Jeremy Menchik discussed 
other convincing argument about how the structural factor gave orientating 
role for human being to act. He, for example, explain how godly 
nationalism11 contributed to the escalating violence (Menchik, 2014, p. 
294). Hence, when we analyse human disposition, especially related to 
President Yudhoyono’s response to violence against Ahmadiyah and Shia 
congregations, we need to strike the balance between the two factors that I 
aforementioned.  
In preceding paragraphs, I show limits of structural and rational actor 
theory to explain about the agency of president Yudhoyono in dealing with 
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the incidents of religious violence. In the following section, I will 
discussmore sensible approach in understanding what factors that affected 
President SusiloBambangYudhoyono’s dispositions in response to the rising 
incidents of religious violence during his terms of presidency, drawn from 
the interplay between agency and structure point of view. 
 
The interplay between agency and structure 
Anthony Gidden believed that in most cases, human being actions 
were routine actions, perpetrated in unconscious mode of actions. As 
Giddens has it: “much of our day-to-day conduct is not directly motivated” 
(Giddens, 1984, p. 6). However, in unusual circumstances, human beings 
are capable of overcoming the structure and hence, are acting in rational 
ways. In the case of Yudhoyono, Yudhoyono’s natural style of indecisiveness 
influenced by past experience might come up (during spontaneous acts) 
when he came across with certain events. However, many governance affairs 
did not require spontaneous acts to respond. In other cases, Yudhoyono 
had time to consult with his subordinates and even surveys, and hence, he 
would be able to come up with measured and rational decisions to 
overcome the structure (his past experience that resulted to his 
indecisiveness, or his internal structure; and his external structure, namely 
godly nationalism). Yudhoyono often came up with measures acts and 
statements. Before he appeared in front of public or before he held press 
conference, he produced meticulous preparations, which aimed to enhance 
or to maintain public support.  
Yudhoyono was conscious that in the era of direct election, public 
support was important for his staying in power or for leaving untarnished 
legacy after he left office; hence, he often relied to opinion polls before he 
made decisions (Fealy, 2015, p. 48). He was often accused for being 
indecisive; for example, he was often silent although people waited for his 
comments, after incidents of religious violence occurred, and hence he was 
often portrayed as indecisive and ignorance to the plight of the minority. 
However, was it ignorance? Was it his deliberate attempt to wait for the 
right momentum to digest any information about the event, and then after 
he obtained all the necessary information, he will come up with statements?  
 Bourdieu gave similar tone such as Gidden. Bourdieu believed that 
past experiences and class shaped the character and attitude of the 
individual. However, Bourdieu also believed that, despite the mental 
structure or habitus, human being could improvise. As Bourdieu has it: “it is 
never ruled out that the responses of the habitusmay be accompanied by a 
strategic calculation tending to perform in a conscious mode that the 
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habitus performs quite differently, namely an estimation of chances 
presupposing transformation of the past effect into an expected objective” 
(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). Human being is capable of adjusting mental 
structure to the present situations in the field, in which the present 
situations could be different with “the constraints and the opportunities are 
similar to those present during the formative period of the habitus” (Swartz, 
2002, p. 66).Yudhoyono’s habit in using pollster in his second term of 
presidency to gauge public sentiment was evidence that the agent had the 
capacity to improvise.  
 
Case Studies: President Yudhoyono’s Responses to Violence against 
Ahmadiyya and Shia 
The event that describes that the interplay framework was more 
relevant to explain President Yudhoyono’s disposition was the 
establishment of the Joint Ministerial Decree on Ahmadiyah in 2008, or the 
year when Yudhoyonowas campaigning for re-election. The event began 
when Yudhoyono administration faced mounting demands from 
conservative Muslims to disband Ahmadiyah, which they considered 
heretical.12There were series of negotiations among the government 
representatives, Ahmadiyah board of executives and groups that represent 
conservative Muslims. However, the negotiations were going nowhere and 
any agreement was never reached.  
 A major incident near the State Palace on 1 June 2008 expedited 
the central government’s decision to issue a decree on Ahmadiyah. The 
incident began when some 1,500 activists of pluralism (AKKBB) held 
function in the National Monument (MONAS) compound to 
commemorate the birth of Pancasila. The function ended up in chaos as 
hundreds of people wearing uniform of the Islamic Defender’s Front (FPI) 
attacked the activists and hence, 34 people were hospitalized. In rare 
gestures, President SusiloBambangYudhoyono issued strong statement and 
ordered for the attackers to be apprehended. He also used strong language: 
“the state should not be afraid. The state should not lose (against those who 
tarnished pluralism)” (Nasution, 2012, p. 105).The police responded to the 
President’s gesture, and arrested two executives of FPI. But, about a week 
later (June 9, 2008), protesters from several groups that demand the 
disbandment of Ahmadiyah descended to the State Palace and threatened 
the government that they would take law into their own hands if the 
government failed to disband Ahmadiyah.  
 But, Adnan BuyungNasution, who served as Yudhoyono advisor 
during Yudhoyono’s term of presidency, wrote in his book that long before 
Kawalu: Journal of Local Culture Vol 3, No. 1 (January-June), 2016 
14 
the incident, Yudhoyonoactually already made up his mind about his 
decision on Ahmadiyah. During an informal wedding reception event in 
Bandung, West Java, Yudhoyono revealed his stance about how to resolve 
controversy about Ahmadiyah. Yudhoyonotold Adnan Buyung in private 
that his ministers would come up with the government decree to address 
Ahmadiyah issue (Nasution, 2012, pp. 100-101). The Ministers (Minister of 
Religious Affairs, Minister of Home Affairs and the chief of Prosecutor’s 
Office) drafted the decree under Yudhoyonoguidance, but the draft of the 
decree never took effect. The decree was issued only after the big protest 
took place in front of the State Palace on June 9, 2008.  
 The decree content suggested that the central government was 
pursuing middle way. The decree was crafted to accommodate the anti-
Ahmadiyah groups and their opponents, the liberal camp that supported 
the minority congregation. For example, through the decree, the 
government accommodated demands by anti-Ahmadiyah groups by 
orderingAhmadiyah leaders and members to stop doing activities that were 
considered to be challenging the mainstream interpretation of Islam, such 
as disseminating faith that Mirza GhulamAchmad is the last prophet, 
instead of Muhammad.13On the other hand, the decree did not mention 
about the disbandment of Ahmadiyah. It means that the decree item still 
recognizes the legal presence of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia, despite mounting 
pressures from the anti-Ahmadiyah groups to disband Ahmadiyah.Hence, 
this decree item was to accommodate the minority and human rights 
groups, who fought for Ahmadiyah legal existence in Indonesia, which was 
seen as important to ensure the congregation’s rights to practice their faith.  
 The preceding paragraphs showed that the whole process leading to 
the issuance of the decree revealed about Yudhoyono dispositions. 
Yudhoyono’s tendency to avoid confrontation was seen through his being 
reluctant to handle the case by himself, althoughYudhoyono stated 
Ahmadiyah case was one of most important case to be settled in his 
presidential career.14Yudhoyono claimed that Ahmadiyah case was among 
few cases where he handled directly (Yudhoyono, 2014, p. 568).15 However, 
instead of producing the presidential decree, he delegated the task to his 
ministers. By doing that, Yudhoyono retreated from the spotlight, which 
allowed him to escape potential scrutiny from the opposing sides: anti-
Ahmadiyah groups (who were silently backed by big Muslim organizations 
such as NadhlatulUlama and Muhammadiyah), and on the other side, the 
human right activists and liberal media.  
 The content of the decree was the reflection of un-confrontational 
and accommodating traits of President Yudhoyono. However, on the other 
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hand, the way he handled the decree’s deliberation showed his meticulous 
rationalpolitical calculations. Avoiding the scrutiny is important to 
maintain his popularity, in the run up to the 2009 elections. Had he 
followed godly nationalism, he would have allowed his ministers to ban 
Ahmadiyah.16 Instead, he instructed his subordinate to pursue for middle-
way, in a sense that in one hand, the joint ministerial decree was to ban 
Ahmadi from disseminating and practicing their faiths, while on the other 
hand, theYudhoyono government recognized the presence of Ahmadiyah 
despite mounting oppositions from anti-Ahmadiyah groups.  
 Although Yudhoyono was raised in environment where the 
education and the way he was brought up were to support godly 
nationalism view; but as social actor, as the story in the preceding 
paragraphs has showed, he had the capacity to act strategically against the 
structure. He did not all the time succumb to the past effect, but he was 
capable of acting in rational way. At times, Yudhoyono was capable of doing 
quick and decisive actions. Yudhoyono reacted quickly and demanded 
security and government officials to take strong response against the 
burning of houses belonged to Shia residents in Nangkernang and 
GadingLaok hamlets in Sampang regency, East Java province in 2012. The 
incident – where Sunni residents clashed and overwhelmed much smaller 
band of their Shia neighbours – claimed the life of a Shia resident, resulted 
into at least 12 Sunni and Shia residents were injured and 49 houses of 
Shia residents spanning in two hamlets were burned down. The incident 
attracted attention of the domestic and international media, given that the 
massive scale of the incident is unprecedented. It fuelled public concern 
because it confirms earlier fear among public that Shia would be the target 
of attacks and vandalism following frequent similar acts that targeted 
Ahmadiyah adherents in other parts of Indonesia during the post-New 
Order era.   
 Less than 24 hours after the incident, President 
SusiloBambangYudhoyono convened a limited cabinet meeting that 
involved cabinet members with security portfolios. The meeting was 
followed up with a press conference where the president ordered security 
officials to take stern measures against those who were held responsible 
during the incident. In a rare public gesture, the President bluntly blamed 
State intelligence officials of the police and the Indonesian military for 
being incapable of preventing the incident from happening. He said the 
police and military intelligence should have been able to anticipate and to 
prevent the incident, moreover that the incident was not the first of its kind 
(TindakTegasPelakuKekerasanSampang/Take Stern Measures against 
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Perpetrators of Sampang Attacks, 2012). The President’s tough statement 
led into swift follow up by top level State security officials. Few hours after 
the cabinet meeting, then Chief of the National Police Gen. TimurPradopo 
held separate press conference and announced that seven people were 
arrested for their respective roles in the incident, while three others were 
still at large (SBY: Lack of Intelligence Let Down Shia Victims, 2012). 
Then, TimurPradopo joined high-powered team of State security officials 
touring into the conflict area. Also included in the tour were then Chief of 
the Indonesian military, Admiral AgusSuhartono and chief of the 
Indonesian Intelligence Agency (BIN), Maj. Gen. Marciano Norman.    
 In other case, the president swiftly ordered the police to arrest top 
executives of the Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI), after their members 
attacked a group of people campaigning for religious tolerance in the 
National Monument on June 2, 2008.17 The police responded to the order 
and arrested the FPI’s two executives two days later. The executives were 
brought to court and served jail sentence one and a half years each. The 
evidence shows that when the situation required, the president could be 
decisive and quick in producing the strong response. However, the attitude 
was not consistent, and hence, such gestures failed to produce deterrence 
effects, which resulted to frequent incident of religious violence. 
 
Conclusion 
I have explained the key debates between the supporters of the 
structuralism and rational actor theory. By using the case study of President 
SusiloBambangYudhoyono’s response to violence against minority 
congregations, Ahmadiyya and Shia, I show the limits of the two theoretical 
frameworks. The Indonesian case study suggests that the interplay between 
agency and structure was more forceful in explaining social phenomena. 
The framework reconciles the opposing arguments between the structural 
and rational actor theory.The research that focused on studying either side 
would tend to lose holistic picture about what factors that motivated or 
prompted the president to act or to react toward rising religious intolerance 
that led to growing incidents of religious violence during 
SusiloBambangYudhoyono’s two terms of presidency. As I show through 
the study case, what we learn from the episode of 
SusiloBambangYudhoyono as president was that he was human agent 
whose actions were limited by the structure. However, on the other side, he 
was also rational actor that performed measured actions to pursue his own 
interests.  
 
A’anSuryana, President Yudhoyono’s Response to Violence against Ahmadiyah and Shia 
17 
 
Endnotes: 
                                                          
1
 A’an Suryana (the author) is a PhD candidate at the School of Culture, History 
and Language (CHL) at the Australian National University. He is a lecturer (non-active) at 
Swiss German University, Tangerang Selatan, Banten province. The author is writing a 
PhD thesis, titled: “Indonesian state officials and violence against Ahmadiyah and Shia 
congregations.” Email: aan.suryana@gmail.com 
2 The data was generated from compilation of annual surveys held by Setarabetween 
2007 and 2011. Sample of such reports can be found at Setara Institute Report (2011). 
Can be accessed at: http://setara-institute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Laporan-
KBB-2011_Politik-Diskriminasi-Rezim-SBY_Setara-Institute.pdf. 
3 Wahid Institute started the similar annual survey in 2008.Sample of such report 
can be found at Wahid Institute Report (2011). Can be accessed at: 
http://wahidinstitute.org/wi-
eng/images/upload/dokumen/laporan_kebebasan_beragama_wahid_institute_2011.pdf. 
4 Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Governments stipulates that the regional 
governments manage governance affairs that are under their authority, except in the affairs 
of international relations, defense, security, judicial, the national monetary and fiscal 
affairs; and religious affairs. 
5 After reform movement in 1998, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) – 
which concerned about abuse of power for 32 years by then President Soeharto – amended 
the constitution and limited the power of president. The amended constitution rules that 
the President cannot dissolve the parliament. The president and the DPR’s positions are 
equal. The president needs to seek for DPR’s approval before the bill he is proposing is 
passed into law (although vice versa, the DPR needs president approval when they propose 
bills to the president). Although the president retains final say in appointing Indonesian 
ambassadors for foreign countries, but before the decisions are taken, the ambassador 
candidates have to participate in the fit and proper tests conducted by the DPR. However, 
despite the amendment, the office of the president still has considerable power. According 
to the amended 1945 constitution, the president is the chief of the Indonesian military. 
The chief of the National Police – who deals with the domestic security and law 
enforcement – is responsible to the president. The president has the power to produce 
governmental regulations in lieu of law (PeraturanPemerintahPenggantiUndang-Undang/Perpu), 
when the situation requires it, by passing the House of Representatives (DPR). The 
president is vested with the power to grant amnesty and abolition. The House of 
Representatives has the right to propose bills to the president; but, if the president 
disagrees with the bills, the bills cannot be proposed again during the same term of the 
House.  
6 Based on the structuralism works of Mary Douglas on purity and danger, Mary 
McCoy argues that it was common practice among state officials in Indonesia to “construct 
the nation as corporeal entity” (McCoy, 2013, p. 277). The metaphor extends 
communitarian value; however, it justifies purification practice in all sectors, which aims at 
allowing people to grab or to stay in power. In the New Order era, Soeharto used the state 
ideology, Pancasila, to quell his critics. The history repeated itself, albeit with the different 
actors. In the post-New Order era, the oppressive actors were the radical religious leaders, 
who collaborated with the state official, to advance their power agenda. As Mary has it: 
“both radical and mainstream religious leaders, backed by allies in government and state 
security, are again using a harmony-and-stability rhetoric to justify repression, arguing that 
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certain religious groups are threatening public order by proselytizing or otherwise insulting 
Islam” (McCoy, 2013, p. 277). 
7 His introduction to democracy began in early 1980 when he had opportunity to 
participate in military training in the United States. During his three decades military stint, 
Yudhoyono frequently participated in the military trainings in Western countries and even 
obtained a master degree from an American university, and hence, the education 
contributed into him being modern and professional soldier. In SBY: Sang Demokrat, 
Yudhoyono acknowledged that the trainings gave him the opportunity to read and to learn 
about democracy from his international peers, and hence, his participation in the trainings 
helped internalize democracy values toward Yudhoyono (Hisyam, 2004, p. 270). 
8 Interestingly, one of SBY’s poems written on Jan. 8, 2004, or in the run up to his 
presidential campaign, was titled: Light of Islam. The poem appeared in one of the 
acknowledgment pages of his authorized, semi-official biography: SBY Sang Demokrat/SBY 
the Democrat. It was evidence that winning hearts and minds of Muslims was one of SBY 
priorities in his quest for presidency. The book, published by Dharmapena publishing in 
March 2004, was written by a team of writers led by senior journalist UsamahHisyam.  
9 Then president SusiloBambangYudhoyono gave speech in the MUI’s annual 
congress in 2005, which basically gave acknowledgment that MUI was the premiere 
religious authority in Indonesia and that the government officials needed to consult or to 
pay greater attention to MUI’s policies in areas related to the affairs of religion. The 
statement enhanced MUI’s influence, not only before the public, but also before the 
government officials, including security and judiciary forces as if it has force of legislation.  
10 However, Robin Bush’s argument had some flaws. The argument implies that 
Yudhoyono appointed several figures as ministers and advisors to materialize his godly 
nationalism view, such as GamawanFauzi and Suryadharma Ali; but it was not the case. 
When these ministers were in power, they extended their own conservative views. 
GamawanFauzi, then Minister of Home Affairs during Yudhoyono’s second term 
administration, was chosen not because he had conservative leaning, but because he was 
supporter of Yudhoyono and Budiono ticket during 2009 presidential election; and he was 
also respected and successful regent of Solok and governor of West Sumatra, with strong 
anti-corruption credential. It was different matter when he eventually endured conservative 
view when he was serving as minister. Having said that, however, I agree that Yudhoyono 
was responsible and should have taken necessary step to contain Gamawan’s more 
conservative leaning when he was serving as Minister of Home Affairs between 2009 and 
2014. One of Gamawan’s infamous stances was when he encouraged regional government 
to collaborate with the Islamic Defender’s Front (FPI) to assist them manage urban affairs 
of their respective areas. FPI was infamous and notorious for its frequent raids against 
entertainment establishments and anti-minority stances. Suryadharma Ali, who was 
staunch anti-Ahmadiyah and Shia figures, was chosen as Minister of Religious Affairs on 
the ground that Yudhoyono needed politics supports from large party that Suryadharma 
Ali then chaired, the United Development Party (PPP); and not because his anti-minority 
stances. However, just like Gamawan, Yudhoyono should be held responsible for 
Suryadharma’s anti-minority policies when he was serving as Minister of Religious Affairs.  
11 Godly nationalism is defined as an imagined community bound by a common, 
orthodox theism and mobilized through the state in cooperation with religious 
organizations in society (Menchik, 2014, p. 294).   
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12Yudhoyono contributed to the mounting demands as his government gave leeway 
for MUI to assume central role in the country in matters related to the aqida(creed) during 
the MUI congress in 2005, which was followed with prolonged nationwide protest against 
Ahmadiyah. 
13 The item produced greater repercussions in the regions as anti-Ahmadiyah groups 
and even regional governments used the decree’s item to campaign and to create bylaws 
that banned Ahmadiyah from practicing and disseminating their faiths.   
14 Then Regent of Kuningan regency, Aang Hamid Suganda, spoke to local 
newspaper Radar Cirebon that then presidential spokesman Julian Aldrin Pasha called him 
on behalf of president SusiloBambangYudhoyono, asking the Regent about the latest 
development in Ahmadiyah village of Manislor, following major attacks against Ahmadiyah 
houses and mosques in the village in the regency in July 2010 (President Tanya 
SoalAhmadiyah/President Inquires About Ahmadiyah, 2010). The village is home to some 
3,200 Ahmadiyah residents, making it the largest Ahmadiyah village in Southeast Asia. The 
3,200 Ahmadis are 70 percent of total village population. The phone call was evidence that 
SBY paid significant attention to Ahmadiyah issue.   
15 Other case was tug of war between the Indonesian police and the Commission 
Eradicating Corruption (KPK), polemics about election of Aceh governor, Shia-Sunni 
conflict in Sampang and clemency for over 100 Indonesians waiting for executions 
overseas.   
16 The detail about the process of issuing the decree is spelled out in the later 
section of this chapter. 
17 The group of some unarmed 1,500 people, mostly women – called themselves the 
Nationhood Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Beliefs (Aliansi Kebangsaan Untuk 
Kebebasan Beragamadan Berkeyakinan) – were commemorating the birth of the state official 
ideology Pancasila, when some hundreds of FPI members attacked them by using bamboo 
sticks. Thirty four people were hospitalized after the attacks, which occurred just hundreds 
of meters away from the State Palace. Ten of them sustained severe injuries.  
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